Is the development of theory of mind continuous or discontinuous?

Keeping in mind the unit 7 file (attached to order) Please answer, and support your answers with appropriate references:
Is the development of theory of mind continuous or discontinuous?

Keeping in mind the unit 7 file (attached to order) Please answer, and support your answers with appropriate references:
Is the development of theory of mind continuous or discontinuous?
What is the evidence for and against the position that language is innate?

Unit 7 – Theory of mind and Language
Unit Introduction
Having focused on prenatal and neonatal development, we will now turn to focus on early childhood development and particularly the development of two areas of

cognition: theory of mind and the use of language.

At the end of this unit, you should:
1.   Be able to describe and evaluate theories of and research on theory of mind development.
2.   Compare and contrast models stage-like vs. continuous models of theory of mind development.
3.   Critically compare and evaluate the nativist and constructivist views of language acquisition.
What is Theory of Mind (ToM)?
According to Lewis & Mitchell (1994), having a ‘theory of mind’ means having the “ability to make inferences about others’ representational states and to predict

behaviour accordingly”. For example, when we see someone behaving in a certain way (such as putting their umbrella up or saying “it is raining hard”), we will make the

inference that they have a belief about the current weather conditions (i.e. they believe that it is raining). We can use our understanding of their mental state to

predict other behaviour (e.g. driving to the shops rather than walking).

The term ‘theory of mind’ was coined by Premack & Woodruff (1978) and was actually used to refer to chimpanzees rather than humans. However, since the early 1980s, a

vast body of research on theory of mind in humans (particularly children and clinical populations) has been carried out. Although this term is now universally used to

refer to the understanding of mental states, a number of other terms have been used to describe similar phenomena. Whiten (1994) lists some of these:

Alternative labels for, and Concepts about, Mindreading (Whiten, 1994)
•   Folk Psychology (Wundt, 1916)
•   Consciousness of the feeling of their fellows (Thorndike, 1911)
•   Imputation to others of firsthand experience (Lloyd Morgan, 1930)
•   Naïve psychology (Heider, 1958)
•   Second order intentionality (Dennett, 1971)
•   Intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1977)
•   Theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978)
•   Metarepresentation (Pylyshyn, 1978)
•   Belief-desire reasoning (Davidson, 1980)
•   Natural psychology (Humphrey, 1980)
•   Social referencing (Feinman, 1982)
•   Mindreading (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984)
•   Mental simulation (Gordon, 1986)
•   Mentalising (Morton, 1989)
•   Perception of intentionality (Dasser et al., 1989)
•   (Mental) attribution (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990)
•   Mentalistic theory of behaviour (Perner, 1991)
•   Representational theory of mind (Perner, 1991)
Someone with a theory of mind imputes mental states to himself and others. He understands that other people and himself have beliefs, thoughts, knowledge, feelings,

desires etc. Crucially this ability allows us to grasp the concept that our behaviour is a consequence of what we believe to be true, which doesn’t always correspond

to what is actually true.

For example, imagine a scenario in which you tell a lecturer that you couldn’t make it to a lecture because your car broke down. The lecturer will probably believe

this to be true, even if the reality is that you had a very late night and couldn’t get out of bed in time. Of course, this can get complicated: If the lecturer saw

you out the night before then they probably won’t believe your story and will presume that you couldn’t get out of bed. You, however, will believe that the lecturer

believes you.

Another example is the ‘double cross’ spy stories: The Russians think that the spy is working for them, but the spy is actually pretending that he’s working for the

Russians whilst working for the British all the time. This, of course, can get more complicated. In the ‘double double cross’, the spy thinks that the Russians think

that he is working for them, but in reality the Russians know that the spy is double crossing them and is working for the British. All of this relies on us and the spy

and the Russians having a theory of mind, which means that we are able to see that what people believe to be true can be different from what actually is true. In

particular we are able to reason about what others believe to be true – this is why it’s called a ‘theory’ of mind; it’s the ability to hold reasoned rational

explanations for the behaviour of others.
What about ToM in Children?
Of interest to us, of course, are the questions of how and when this ability to understand other people’s (and our own) mental states develops. The ‘classic’ answer to

the question of when theory of mind develops is that children below about 4 years of age do not have theory of mind. This finding results from a number of experiments